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A glaring asymmetry, obvious at this meeting, is
that historians dress better than philosophers –
historians always being interested in the details,
sartorial and otherwise, while philosophers seem
concerned only with dressing in general.
– Richards (1992)
Abstract We respond to two kinds of skepticism about integrated history and philos-
ophy of science: foundational and methodological. Foundational skeptics doubt that
the history and the philosophy of science have much to gain from each other in prin-
ciple. We therefore discuss some of the unique rewards of work at the intersection
of the two disciplines. By contrast, methodological skeptics already believe that the
two disciplines should be related to each other, but they doubt that this can be done
successfully. Their worries are captured by the so-called dilemma of case studies:
On one horn of the dilemma, we begin our integrative enterprise with philosophy
and proceed from there to history, in which case we may well be selecting our his-
torical cases so as to fit our preconceived philosophical theses. On the other horn,
we begin with history and proceed to philosophical reflection, in which case we are
prone to unwarranted generalization from particulars. Against worries about selec-
tion bias, we argue that we routinely need to make explicit the criteria for choosing
particular historical cases to investigate particular philosophical theses. It then be-
comes possible to ask whether or not the selection criteria were biased. Against
worries about unwarranted generalization, we stress the iterative nature of the pro-
cess by which historical data and philosophical concepts are brought into alignment.
The skeptics’ doubts are fueled by an outdated model of outright confirmation vs.
outright falsification of philosophical concepts. A more appropriate model is one of
stepwise and piecemeal improvement.
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1 Introduction
Integrated history and philosophy of science must steer clear of two opposite
methodological pitfalls. One is the unwarranted generalization of grand philosophi-
cal theses from a handful of historical case studies. The other is the outright imposi-
tion of philosophical concepts upon cases that serve as mere Potemkin villages. The
task is difficult, and many have claimed it not to be worth the trouble. Some philoso-
phers will argue that their discipline seeks a kind of systematic knowledge that does
not need to be sensitive to the detailed study of cases from actual scientific practice.
Conversely, some historians of science will argue that historical understanding is
possible without the abstract concepts that contemporary philosophy of science has
to offer.
Thus, the present contribution has a foundational and a methodological purpose.
Section 2 articulates our view of what we can find at the intersection of history and
philosophy of science (HPS) that each discipline on its own cannot offer. We ex-
pect some version of our “fundamental motivation” for an integrated HPS to meet
with broad consensus – not only among those who self-identify as historians and
philosophers of science, but also among the many philosophers of science who em-
brace case studies (from contemporary or historical science) as a routine part of their
work.
Our remaining discussion takes up the greater difficulty: It outlines some best
methodological practices for relating history to philosophy (and vice versa) in case
studies. While a robust grounding in both historical and philosophical methods is
indispensable, we believe that the integrated HPS project requires an additional set
of skills that currently receive little discussion. We will begin with the so-called
dilemma of case studies, which encapsulates the two methodological challenges we
introduced above (section 3). First, how can we apply philosophical concepts to his-
torical cases without selection bias – that is, without choosing our historical cases
such that they are merely convenient illustrations of preconceived philosophical the-
ses? We will outline how historical cases can play a probative role in philosophical
investigations by allowing us to test and refine our best concepts about science (sec-
tion 4). Second, how should the confrontation of philosophical concepts and histor-
ical theses proceed? We will suggest a model that emphasizes iterative, piecemeal
conceptual engineering instead of generalizations from particular cases (section 5).
The view of integrated HPS we will be presenting is not new, and it is not our
intention to educate colleagues. Rather, we see our contribution as an attempt at
explicating a method already widely used by many practitioners in the field. If our
contribution is successful, other scholars will accept this invitation to join us in a
renewed, explicit reflection on the methodology of integrated HPS.
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2 The fundamental motivation for an integrated history and
philosophy of science
We recognize a plurality of different approaches within HPS.1 However, for the
purposes of the present contribution our interests mainly belong to a particular view
of the history-philosophy interaction. On this view, philosophy of science provides
us with a set of concepts and worthwhile questions about the history of science –
questions that are particularly pertinent to science’s core epistemological concerns.
Conversely, the history of science grounds philosophical reflection in actual sci-
ence – in brief, it enables a naturalistic approach to the questions of philosophy of
science concerning such issues as confirmation, explanation, reduction, discovery,
long-term theory change, and so on. Our flavor of integrated HPS derives its value
from this unique interaction: it provides the historian with theoretically rich con-
cepts and questions, and it grounds its philosophical concepts in actual scientific
practice.2
2.1 Questions for history
Historical sources are powerful: they can bring into focus vague questions and dif-
fuse notions about science. But it is also a well understood fact that the sources
fail to speak for themselves. The sources speak because we ask specific, carefully
crafted questions of them. It is at best a curiosity to learn that Darwin, in his Beagle
notebooks, used various spellings of words like “occasion”, “coral” and “Pacific”
– but it becomes a revealing fact once we use these spelling variants to date Dar-
win’s conversion to transformationism after the Galapagos (Sulloway, 1982). If the
sources sometimes seem to almost force themselves on us, it is because we read
them with well prepared minds.
The focus of most current historians of science is on questions about the cultural,
social and material context of scientific inquiry. Three decades ago, this shift was
welcome as a corrective to an earlier tradition which was overly focused on great
men and great ideas, or theories and theoreticians. We now have a much richer
understanding of science as a human activity than in the past.
However, other types of questions have been neglected or even rejected. In partic-
ular, the core philosophical concerns about science have not in recent years received
much historical elucidation: discovery, justification, representation, explanation, and
1 Jutta Schickore (2011) gives a good overview of the debates about integrated history and phi-
losophy of science since the middle of the 20th century, and she cites many key works. Howard
(2011) offers a more long-term history of the relation of the two fields and discusses some of the
fundamental reasons for their separation in the 20th century. A good snapshot of the state of the
field in the new millennium can be found in Arabatzis and Schickore (2012).
2 While we focus on one flavor of HPS, we see others as complementary and equally valuable. For
instance, a key project is to trace the origin and growth of modern concepts, theories and questions
(Lennox, 2001; Schickore, 2011).
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so on. It is time to reverse this trend. To echo an earlier generation of scholars, the
historical neglect of philosophical issues is an opportunity missed and a responsibil-
ity avoided (cf. Laudan et al, 1986, p. 152). By reintegrating philosophical concerns
with historical scholarship, we will gain richer histories.3 The penalty for foregoing
this reintegration is an inadequate picture of the scientific enterprise – a picture just
as inadequate as one that pays no attention to cultural context, institutional frame-
works, or societal organization.
A serious historical investigation of philosophical questions promises to teach
us much about how scientists conceive of new hypotheses, and more broadly about
what strategies they employ for solving empirical problems. We will be able to study
in greater depth how actual scientific communities have debated different types of
empirical evidence (not just rhetorically, but epistemologically) and how they have
adjusted their judgments in accordance with it. We will finally find out whether
individual scientific disciplines grow essentially cumulatively or by sharp discon-
tinuities – which remains, in many ways, as open a question as it was when Kuhn
put it on the scene in the 1960s. Similarly, once we go beyond the limiting no-
tion that there is nothing to scientific consensus except for rhetoric, negotiation and
power, we find ourselves confronted with the very real and pressing question of how
groups – rather than mere individuals – conduct collaborative and competitive epis-
temic projects. For the most part, historically deep and philosophically informative
historical studies of these and similar issues remain to be written.
In summary, philosophical issues are a rich resource for asking historical ques-
tions that are particularly pertinent to science, but this approach remains under-
appreciated both in theory and in practice. In consequence, we miss the chance of
a deeper understanding of what makes science special as an epistemic enterprise.
However, we do not envision the use of philosophical questions in historical schol-
arship as a one-way interaction, as we will discuss further in the next subsection and
in the remainder of this paper: While philosophical questions should be asked of his-
tory, we also believe that history will allow us to refine our philosophical questions
and indeed to answer them in unexpected and uniquely informative ways.
2.2 Naturalism for philosophy
Fifty years ago, philosophical skepticism about integrated history and philosophy
of science centered around the issue of normativity: If the goals of philosophy of
science are normative, then what does a descriptive project like the history of science
have to do with it? For one may study Galielei’s or Darwin’s methodology to one’s
heart’s content, but this will not shed any light on the normative question of whether
their methods are justified. When we ask whether science should proceed in one
way or another, the answer will not come from a descriptive historical study but
3 An indication of this is the tradition of “historical epistemology” (see e.g. Rheinberger, 1997,
Daston and Galison, 2007, and the special issue of Erkenntnis edited by Feest and Sturm, 2011).
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from a normative philosophical argument. In effect, history was short-circuited out
of philosophical discussions.
The normativity objection found its most famous expression in Ronald Giere’s
“marriage of convenience” paper, long a cornerstone of philosophical skepticism
about integrated HPS. Giere wrote:
If one grants that epistemology is normative, it follows that one cannot get an epistemology
out of the history of science — unless one provides a philosophical account which explains
how norms are based on facts. This ought to be a central problem for historically oriented
philosophers of science, but few seem willing even to acknowledge the question, let alone
attack it head on. (Giere, 1973, p. 290)
From the normative perspective, Giere’s challenge is perhaps as close as one can
get to an ironclad argument against the philosophical relevance of the history of
science. On this view, history can only play a heuristic role by allowing us to iden-
tify problems and outline possible solutions that then require proper philosophical
analysis. At most, normative philosophy of science needs a link to the history of
science in order to be a philosophy of science, rather than of some logically possible
state of affairs. Or as Norwood Russell Hanson (1962) put it, the pure philosopher’s
“analytical skill may be admirable, but it does not take us anywhere” (p. 586).
However, in the decade after the “marriage of convenience” paper Giere changed
his mind and began to give a much more crucial role to history. He now argued that
he had misconstrued the issue; that all known normative approaches had stalled;
and that naturalism offered the best prospect for a successful philosophy of science
(Giere, 1985). In a recent paper, he summarized his change of mind:
I came to the conclusion that the philosophy of science should be transformed into some-
thing like the theory of science. That is, philosophers should be in the business of construct-
ing a theoretical account of how science works. Philosophical claims about science would
then have the status of empirical theories. In short, the philosophy of science should be
naturalized. This means, among other things, giving up pretensions to finding autonomous
standards for the practice of science. (Giere, 2011, p. 60–61)
In a naturalized philosophy of science, history of science ceases to be a heuris-
tic crutch.4 Instead, it turns into the indispensable empirical basis for a theoretical
enterprise that is best understood in analogy to other theoretical enterprises in the
natural and social sciences. Much as ecologists model interspecific competition, or
as macroeconomists model the effects of monetary policy, philosophers of science
model scientific confirmation, explanation, theory choice, or what have you.
The naturalistic turn deflects the normativity objection by reconstruing the HPS
project along the lines of the empirical sciences. But even though it begins with and
emphasizes description, the naturalized project shares many of the goals of the old
4 We prefer not to draw a strong distinction between historical and contemporary scientific practice
as an object of study. What would have been “contemporary” science to Giere in 1985 is “histor-
ical” now, but the theoretical questions we ask about our cases remain largely the same. The only
difference are in the methods of study: How recent an episode is will partly dictate whether our
tools will include archival studies, oral histories, laboratory notebooks, or questionnaires, not to
mention “embedding” oneself in a research group. Depending on method, of course, some ques-
tions will be easier to answer than others.
6 Raphael Scholl and Tim Räz
normative project. HPS does not turn into a purely descriptive project because we
understand it to have two tasks: description and justification (see also Lipton, 2004).
That is, we wish to give an adequate description of past and present science, but we
also wish to understand how the epistemic successes and failures of science can be
accounted for. A theoretical and historical approach to science that cannot explain
successes or recognize mistakes would be a poor one. Traditionally, however, the
normative project took the descriptive task to be fairly trivial, while many naturalists
would argue that adequate description may be the harder of the two tasks.
The task of justification has much in common with the normative project, yet
the naturalized view has at least two advantages. First, a close engagement with the
past and present of scientific practice can serve as an accelerator. Even if it were in
principle possible to do normative philosophy of science from first principles (such
as logic or probability calculus), the project is likely to advance more quickly if ex-
isting practice is taken as a guide. If we wish to understand epistemology, we should
begin with the most successful epistemological enterprise that we know. A second,
much stronger naturalistic argument holds that many issues in the philosophy of
science cannot be tackled from first principles at all. This is because scientific prac-
tices such as induction or explanation may ultimately be grounded in facts about
the world (on induction, see Norton, 2003). For example, the justification for biol-
ogists’ interest in mechanistic explanations (Machamer et al, 2000; Bechtel, 2006)
probably does not derive from any formal philosophical property of such explana-
tions. More likely, biologists have learned in the course of research that mechanistic
explanations are adequate to many parts of their area of inquiry. What counts as a
“normatively” adequate explanatory standard in this case has a necessary empirical
and historical dimension: it concerns what is the case in the world and how we have
learned about it. Thus, while the old normative project aimed for some sort of extra-
empirical justification for the methods of science, strong naturalists expect the task
of justification to be continuous with empirical science itself. But it ultimately does
not matter whether one takes a weak or a strong naturalistic stance: the consideration
of history and actual science helps in either case.
Where the methodology of integrated HPS is concerned, a commitment to some
sort of naturalism is the beginning and not the end of the discussion. It is far from
trivial to see how the combined goals of descriptive adequacy and philosophical
insight can be achieved in practice. Therefore, in the remainder of this contribution
we will discuss what is now perhaps the most pressing methodological problem in
the discipline: best practices for relating history and philosophy of science to each
other.5 We will begin our discussion at the skeptical extreme: with the “dilemma of
case studies”, which suggests that the project of integrated history and philosophy
of science – whether construed naturalistically or not – may be doomed in principle.
5 Pinnick and Gale (2000) commented that “despite the possibility of doing so, philosophers have
not pursued a method of case-study design” (p. 116). They also observed that disciplinary consen-
sus about method coincides with progress.
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3 The dilemma of case studies
If we wish to use historical cases in order to test, refine and expand our best concepts
about science, we are faced with two main problems: selection bias and inappro-
priate generalization from individual cases. In an issue of Perspectives on Science
devoted to the legacy of Thomas Kuhn, Joseph C. Pitt (2001) labeled these twin
dangers as “the dilemma of case studies”. If we approach our project “top down”
(proceeding from philosophy to history) then this leads into the first horn of the
dilemma:
[I]f the case is selected because it exemplifies the philosophical point being articulated, then
it is not clear that the philosophical claims have been supported, because it could be argued
that the historical data was manipulated to fit the point. (p. 373)
Yet it is no solution simply to stick closer to the facts of history, since proceeding
“bottom up” (form history to philosophy) only leads into the second horn of the
dilemma:
[I]f one starts with a case study, it is not clear where to go from there – for it is unreasonable
to generalize from one case or even two or three. (p. 373)
Pitt’s dilemma seems to us to capture the core worries of both philosophers and
historians who are presently skeptical about the project of integrated HPS. Many
historians are wary of philosophically motivated work since the philosophy might
well dictate which historical cases are chosen and how they are interpreted – very
much in line with the first horn of Pitt’s dilemma. Conversely, many philosophers
(even those with a broadly naturalistic outlook) worry that any conclusions drawn
on the basis of historical case studies are ultimately unwarranted generalizations –
and this mirrors the second horn of Pitt’s dilemma.
A number of practitioners of integrated history and philosophy of science have
responded to Pitt’s challenge (Burian, 2001, 2002; Schickore, 2011; Chang, 2011).
Chang in particular has articulated conceptual moves that may allow us to break
free from the dilemma of case studies. He argues that the we should not think of
philosophical concepts as general and historical facts as particular – for this would
indeed lead into fruitless debates about how many white swans are needed to show
that all swans are white. Instead, philosophy provides abstract concepts which are
instantiated to various degrees by concrete historical cases. Chang compares this –
using an admittedly imperfect metaphor – to the relationship between the setting of
a TV series and its episodes:
When we have an episode of The Simpsons, or Buffy the Vampire Slayer, or what have you,
the episode is not really a case or an example of whatever the general idea of the show might
be. Rather, the episode is a concrete instantiation of the general concepts (the characters,
the setting, the type of events to be expected, etc.), and each episode also contributes to the
articulation of the general concepts. (Chang, 2011, pp. 110–111)
Once the relationship between history and philosophy of science is construed in this
way, we stop thinking in terms of working “top down” or “bottom up”. Instead, we
start thinking of a cyclical process: Just as abstract concepts help us to understand
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concrete episodes, so concrete episodes help us to further elaborate our conceptual
tools. On Chang’s view, doing HPS consists in a repeated cycling between the con-
crete and the abstract (figure 1).6
philosophy: general
cases: particular
concepts: abstract
episodes: concrete
(A) (B)
Fig. 1 A: The traditional view of a contrast between general philosophical concepts and particular
historical cases, which are related to each other either top-down or bottom-up. The usual prob-
lems present themselves: How can we move top-down without selection bias? How can we move
bottom-up without unwarranted generalizations? B: A schema of Chang’s alternative view. Instead
of contrasting the general with the particular, it contrasts abstract concepts with concrete instances
in historical episodes. Instead of conceiving of either a bottom-up or a top-down confrontation
of concepts and episodes, Chang proposes an iterative, cyclical movement between concepts and
episodes. The entry into the cycle can occur either with concepts or with episodes: It does not
require us to decide that either concepts or episodes are primary.
Chang’s cyclical model fits better with the actual practice of HPS than Pitt’s top-
down/bottom-up model. It is a useful metaphor for the interaction between history
and philosophy of science. However, it requires further elaboration if it is to provide
the basis for a methodology of HPS.7
In the remainder of this contribution, we will discuss the particulars of both the
downward arrow (from concepts to episodes) and the upward arrow (from episodes
to concept), as well as their cyclical interaction. In section 4, we will discuss criteria
for moving from concepts to episodes without incurring the risk of selection bias. In
6 While we adopt Chang’s general framework, we do not think that much hinges on whether we
speak of “episodes” or “cases”, and we will continue to use both terms.
7 Schickore (2011) has argued that the history-philosophy relationship should not be understood in
terms of a confrontational model, in analogy to the empirical sciences, but in terms of hermeneu-
tics, or “the art of gradually reconciling provisional analytic concepts with a provisional reading of
the historical record” (p. 459). However, we believe that the confrontational and the hermeneutic
models can be reconciled. Certainly the confrontational model must be conceived, as we discuss,
in cyclical and iterative terms. But this is no surprise, since the empirical sciences – on which
the confrontational model is based – are similarly iterative in theory testing. Moreover, HPS is in
part concerned with the beliefs and desires of human actors, the traditional domain of interpretive,
hermeneutic approaches. But this has ample room in the confrontational model, which understands
the study of human beliefs and motives in terms of empirical theses about cognitive states (how
ever difficult these may be to ascertain).
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section 5, we will discuss the handling of agreements and conflicts between concepts
and episodes, which we call the dynamics of confrontation. In particular, we will
discuss the cyclical movement between concepts and episodes which allows us to
achieve a certain kind of generality for our concepts about science.
4 The selection of case studies
Many of the best works in integrated HPS explicitly discuss the merits of their cho-
sen cases: they tell us why a particular case will not merely illustrate but investigate
the worth of particular philosophical claims, or why conclusions reached for one
case are likely to extend to others. However, for the most part the reasons for the
choice of case studies remain implicit, and there is little discussion of a general
methodology by which the selection of case studies should proceed. The aim of
this section is to develop the outlines of such a general methodology. Like many
systematic investigations, we begin with typology: There are a number of differ-
ent purposes that case studies typically serve, and the issues of selection bias and
generalization must be understood in relation to these purposes.
4.1 Hard cases
The basic idea of hard cases is to seek out challenges: instead of selecting cases that
illustrate a philosophical thesis particularly well, we prefer those that are difficult
to accommodate and that therefore put a thesis to the test. To use an engineering
example: If we build a self-driving car that can navigate the busy and complex traffic
of Beijing without accident, then it can probably handle the streets of Zurich as
well. Hard cases demonstrate the power of a principle, and they show that the same
principle can plausibly handle a host of similar but less difficult cases.
Analogies in the sciences are easy to find. Consider for example evolution by
natural selection, for which the Giraffe’s neck is a traditional and well-worn illus-
tration. The illustration is excellent as a didactic tool: it is easy to understand and
contrasts well with the alternative of evolution by use and disuse. However, those
who are skeptical of the power of natural selection will not find the case particu-
larly compelling: neck length may be a fairly trivial trait, and it would be easy to
accept its origin by natural selection while denying that selection can produce more
intricate and complex traits. It is no surprise, then, that evolutionists from Darwin
onward have been particularly interested in hard cases for natural selection such as
the human eye. If a trait as complex as the eye can be explained by natural selection,
then selection has passed a high bar; and this success immediately makes plausible
that more trivial cases can be explained in the same way.
To illustrate the point using an example from our own work, Scholl and Nickelsen
(2015) investigated the genesis of Peter Mitchell’s mechanism of oxidative phospho-
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rylation. This is the main process by which mitochondria transform the energy in
food stuffs into a chemical compound called ATP, which cells, tissues and organs
then use to drive their various processes. Mitchell received a 1978 Nobel Prize for
the formulation of the mechanism, and it has long counted as one of the most spec-
tacularly original contributions to 20th century biology. Leslie Orgel once wrote that
“[n]ot since Darwin and Wallace has biology come up with an idea as counterintu-
itive as those of, say, Einstein, Heisenberg and Schrödinger” (Orgel, 1999, p. 17).
In our study we were able to show that the genesis of the theory can be explained
using concepts from two recent strands in the philosophy of scientific hypothesis
generation. One is interested in how the unknown causes of phenomena are sought
(Graßhoff and May, 1995; Lipton, 2004); another is interested in how new mecha-
nistic hypotheses are generated based on known entities and interactions (Darden,
2006). The first strand allowed us to see that Mitchell’s process of hypothesis gen-
eration, however spectacular the result, occurred in a well-defined space of possible
causal hypotheses. The second strand allowed us to see how this well-defined space
of possible hypotheses was investigated by generating “how possibly” mechanisms.
Our study has special probative force because it deals with a hard case of scien-
tific discovery. No one would claim that the mechanism of oxidative phosphoryla-
tion was a trivial extension of existing biochemical knowledge: It was a theory of
acknowledged novelty and originality. If its genesis is intelligible in terms of a num-
ber of basic heuristics, then the power of those heuristics is credibly demonstrated.
Moreover, that the hard case could be accommodated provides some warrant for
the speculation that many further but less difficult cases of scientific discovery are
amenable to similar analyses.
There is a general recognition that hard cases can be particularly telling. To pick
just one example, many of the philosophically most interesting theses in Inventing
Temperature (2004) rely on Chang first convincing his readers that the measurement
of temperature is, against expectation, a hard case in the history of measurement
techniques. Chang’s notion of epistemic iteration becomes compelling precisely
when we realize that it can illuminate a particularly difficult epistemic advance.
4.2 Paradigm cases
Many cases play a special role in HPS because they have become paradigms of some
aspect of science. In a sense, these cases function like model organisms in biology:
we study them not only as particulars, but as more or less typical instances of some
aspect of science. Like model organisms, paradigm cases offer the advantage of
pre-built resources. The relevant historical documents and the historical context are
usually reasonably well understood, so that new conceptual studies can proceed
rapidly.
A good example of a paradigm case is Semmelweis’s discovery of the cause of
puerperal fever around the middle of the 19th century. The case was introduced
to the philosophy of science in Carl G. Hempel’s Philosophy of Natural Science
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(1966), where it served to illustrate aspects of the confirmation of theory by data.
The case was later revisited by Peter Lipton (2004), who challenged Hempel’s
hypothetico-deductive reconstruction of Semmelweis’s procedure and outlined an
alternative in terms of inference to the best explanation (IBE). Lipton argued that
a number of aspects of Semmelweis’s investigation – including its context of dis-
covery, the rejection of alternative hypotheses, and the confirmation of accepted
hypotheses – remain obscure on a hypothetico-deductive reconstruction but be-
come intelligible in the framework of IBE. Importantly, Lipton was able to draw
on rich existing material concerning Semmelweis’s discovery such as, for example,
K. Codell Carter’s translation of Semmelweis’s main work (Semmelweis, 1983).
The translation, in turn, was partly produced in order to facilitate the use of the
Semmelweis case in a course in philosophy of science. The discussion of the Sem-
melweis case has continued in recent years: Donald Gillies (2005) has argued that a
Kuhnian perspective is necessary for understanding the reception of Semmelweis’s
work; Alexander Bird (2010) sees Semmelweis as an instance of inference to the
only explanation; and one of us has argued that Mill’s four methods of experimen-
tal inquiry play an important role in the confirmation of Semmelweis’s data (Scholl,
2013) – a fact which was previously overlooked because Carter’s translation omitted
Semmelweis’s copious numerical tables, which seemed irrelevant from a Hempelian
perspective. For the most part, these authors are not primarily interested in Semmel-
weis qua Semmelweis: the topic of interest is confirmation, of which Semmelweis
is taken to be a representative instance.
Whether a case deserves the status of a paradigm is itself open to debate. For
example, Dana Tulodziecki (2013) has recently argued that the discussion of Sem-
melweis proceeds from the false assumption that Semmelweis was an excellent rea-
soner. She discusses a number of flaws in Semmelweis’s arguments which indicate
that the case is not, after all, a representative instance of successful scientific rea-
soning. In our view, explicit arguments for and against the representativeness of a
case are required when using paradigm cases.
Importantly, it remains an empirical question whether concepts can be transferred
from the paradigm to other cases. The fact that paradigms are considered typical
instances gives us reason for some optimism that many concepts, once developed
and refined, can be transferred from them to other cases – but whether this is in
fact the case must be checked in further detailed studies. This again mirrors the
use of model organisms, where we also have the expectation but no guarantee of
transferability to other organisms.
Many classical works of HPS use paradigm cases. Take for instance Shapin and
Schaffer’s Leviathan and the Air-Pump (1985). The authors’ discussion of the con-
struction of experimental knowledge is powerful precisely because the air-pump is
emblematic of experimental science. What is true for the air-pump is plausibly true
for countless other experiments. While we would not commit to many of Shapin
and Schaffer’s specific claims, from a methodological point of view the air-pump is
a properly deployed paradigm case.
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4.3 Big cases
The most traditional and straightforward reason for choosing a case study is that it
concerns a big scientific achievement. It may be an achievement that served as a sci-
entific paradigm for many further works; it may be the foundation for a large branch
of present-day science; it may have yielded an understanding of a fundamental as-
pect of nature. In many of the most interesting cases, such as the works of a Newton
or a Darwin, all of the above will apply.
Unlike paradigm cases, big cases cannot be expected to generalize particularly
well. We often assume that big cases are also in some way typical of an aspect
of science, and we may therefore be tempted to generalize from them in the same
way as we do from paradigm cases (section 4.2 above). But of course typicality is
something that cannot be assumed. It is possible that Newton’s efforts to confirm his
theories were quite atypical of how most confirmation in science happens; it may
be that Darwin’s standards for what is an acceptable explanation were atypical of
scientific explanations at most times; and so on. That a big case is also typical of
some aspect of science must be explicitly argued for (or at least stated as a premise)
– and then these cases generalize in virtue of being paradigms.
Similarly, we should not be misled into thinking that all big cases are hard cases.
Certainly influential scientists like Newton and Darwin solved hard empirical prob-
lems. But that does not mean that their work always qualifies as hard cases in the
sense of section 4.1: Whether something is a hard case in our sense depends on
the philosophical thesis under consideration. The genesis of Darwin’s theory may
have been particularly difficult, which makes it a hard case for those who argue
that scientific discovery is explicable in terms of basic heuristics. At the same time,
however, other aspect of Darwin’s work may not constitute a hard test of relevant
philosophical ideas – maybe there is little to be learned from finding that Darwin’s
concept of explanation conformed to the notion that most explanations are mecha-
nistic. Our modest point is simply that whether big cases are also hard cases in the
sense discussed here depends on the philosophical thesis under test.
Even though there is no reason to think that lessons learned from big cases are
necessarily transferable to other cases, we do not think that selection bias is a major
concern. A scholar may choose a big case specifically because it bears out his or
her philosophical idée fixe – but this would nevertheless teach us something inter-
esting about a case we already consider to be important, provided that the concepts
actually apply. Simply put, it is inherently fascinating to understand the particulars
of an important epistemic advance. Moreover, we certainly wish to know whether
our best philosophical concepts can illuminate the epistemic breakthroughs we find
most important. Thus, it is not only allowed but even necessary, sooner or later, to
apply our conceptual tools to the big cases. The only mistake would be to think
that inherent fascination is a substitute for carrying on with the broader program of
HPS: Ultimately, the range of applicability of concepts must be checked using di-
verse cases. To know whether a Newton or a Darwin is typical of science at his time,
or typical of key concepts from the philosophy of science, is part of understanding
the episode.
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Big cases are particularly prone to the underdetermination problem of HPS (see
the introduction to this volume by Sauer and Scholl): the same historical episode is
usually told again and again in different philosophical terms, which raises concerns
that philosophical concepts hinder rather than help our understanding of science.
Most influential scientists have had multiple careers in the literature: as good in-
ductivists, as resourceful hypothetico-deductivists, as epistemically cautious Poppe-
rian falsificationists, perhaps as methodological anarchists, and finally as contingent
products of mostly social forces. Not all of these accounts can be true, but deciding
among them is hindered by the fact that the key questions often concern cognitive
processes of past scientists – to which we have little access. The best defense against
the mindless retelling of big cases according to prevailing philosophical fashion is
not, however, to retreat to some form of dubious historical positivism, but to take
the cyclical model of HPS seriously: We must consider a wide range of cases from
the history of science, use them to improve our conceptual tools, and deploy these
tools to understand episodes at different levels of importance. We will have more to
say about how cases are used to evaluate and refine concepts in section 5.
4.4 Randomized cases
There already exists a widely accepted method for avoiding selection bias in the
sciences: randomization. It is at least conceivable that case studies big and small
could be chosen randomly from a database and submitted to philosophical analysis.
If one had a particular hypothesis about, say, the steps by which model-building
proceeds, it might be possible to ask the database for random instances of model-
based science in order to check the applicability of the hypothesis. While we do not
believe that this should (or could) replace historical judgment in the choice of case
studies, it could be a valuable complement to the way in which historical scholarship
traditionally proceeds.
Before the randomization of case studies becomes feasible, both practical and
conceptual problems need to be addressed. On the practical side, no suitable
database of case studies from the history or the philosophy of science currently
exists. However, it is a reason for optimism that such a database would be desir-
able for any number of purposes apart from randomization. For instance, a database
of case studies could restore unity to a field that has lately focused on historical
micro-studies rather than grand narratives. On the conceptual side, the organization
of the database would be a challenging issue. How are case studies to be individu-
ated and classified in a way that is historically adequate, reasonably theory-neutral
and useful for data retrieval? At minimum, something akin to Pubmed’s Medical
Subject Headings (MeSH) vocabulary would be required. Importantly, long-term
institutional backing would be a prerequisite for the credibility of such a project.
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4.5 First sketch of a typology
We have distinguished between four types of case studies. Each has its own concep-
tual relationship to key concerns such as selection bias and generalizability.
HARD CASES are chosen to be difficult for the philosophical concepts under
study to handle. What counts as a hard case will thus vary depending on the philo-
sophical concepts we are interested in. If a philosophical principle survives contact
with a hard case, this speaks to its power. Hard cases circumvent selection bias by
seeking challenges rather than convenient illustrations. They allow us to draw more
forceful conclusions than individual cases normally do since they give us reason
to think that the tested philosophical principle is powerful enough to handle less
difficult cases as well.
PARADIGM CASES are the model organisms of HPS. We use them in teaching
and research as typical instances of particular aspects of science. Because they are
already accepted as typical, and because the relevant historical sources are usually
easily available, paradigm cases are efficient tools for making new points and for
revising existing concepts. Importantly, whether a case qualifies as paradigmatic is
usually itself a point of debate. And whether concepts that apply to the paradigm
case can be extended to further cases remains, as in the case of model organisms, an
empirical question.
BIG CASES concern influential scientific achievements. They have particular ap-
peal because we inevitably learn something we care about from them – big cases are
important to us! However, big cases must not be assumed to be typical of some as-
pect of science without further argument; nor are they necessarily hard cases, since
this depends on the philosophical concepts under study. Finally, big cases are partic-
ularly attractive targets for retellings according to prevailing philosophical fashions.
This impulse must be resisted by committing in earnest to the cyclical model of
HPS.
RANDOMIZATION of case studies to counteract selection bias is currently little
more than a neat idea, but we think that it is coherent in principle. A reason to
pursue the idea is that a database of case studies would be a useful tool with many
additional uses.
Our typology is not intended as something static and upfront. Cases do not
present themselves to us with a label identifying them as “paradigm” or “hard”
cases. Whether we understand a case as paradigmatic, or as hard with respect to a
philosophical thesis, and so on, should be allowed to develop as our studies progress.
New historical evidence – the cyclical revisions we discuss in the next section – may
well alter our assessment of a case study’s status. Moreover, our typology is unlikely
to be complete: we look forward to the critical discussion of additional types with
their own particular function. Our main point is modest: As we develop research
projects, we should pay greater attention to the ways in which our case studies re-
late to the philosophical theses we wish to demonstrate, criticize or test.
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5 Dynamics of confrontation
Once philosophical theses are confronted with historical cases, agreements and dis-
agreements between them are found. The temptation is to think of these as simple
instances of the confirmation or rejection of general hypotheses by particular facts.
But this temptation must be resisted on pain of two related philosophical sins: the
universal (∀) sin and the existential (∃) sin. When we commit the universal sin, we
assume that what is true for our case study is true for all of science. When we com-
mit the existential sin, we assume that a single counterexample can serve to reject a
philosophical approach. Both procedures are misguided, but how can we do better?
An example from our own research (Scholl and Räz, 2013) will serve to illustrate
some of the moves we think are appropriate for iteratively evaluating and revising
philosophical concepts and for interpreting historical episodes. We are not holding
up our paper as particularly significant, much less do we think the paper should
compel universal assent. Its usefulness as an example rests to a large extent on its
ordinariness: The goal is to illustrate a methodological approach, but this is largely
independent of the truth of the philosophical and historical theses defended.
The starting point of our project was a paper by Michael Weisberg (2007), who
had proposed a distinction between different types of theoretical practices in sci-
ence: modeling and “abstract direct representation” (ADR). In order to illustrate
modeling, Weisberg used Volterra’s work on predator-prey dynamics; to illustrate
ADR, he turned to Darwin’s work on the origin of coral atolls and Mendeleev’s
work on the periodic table of the elements. While we agreed that theorizing is het-
erogeneous, we were interested in how the scientists themselves understood the sub-
categories of their methodological practices, and so turned to the historical sources.
5.1 Agreement
To investigate Volterra’s own views on method, we turned to Volterra and D’Ancona
(1935), which presents a monograph-length exposition of the predator-prey model.
Perhaps as a reaction to the critics of earlier publications of the basic model
(Volterra, 1926a,b, 1928), the monograph contains a methodological discussion as
a preface. These methodological reflections support the idea that there is a con-
trast between more “direct” and more “indirect” theoretical practices. Volterra and
d’Ancona place their own work on predatory-prey dynamics in the latter subcat-
egory. They label their own indirect approach as “deductive”, but we argue (with
Weisberg) that it should be understood in terms of our present-day notion of mod-
eling. Thus, we found an agreement between our philosophical thesis and the his-
torical case: a distinction between modeling and more “direct” theoretical practices
was suggested by the scientists themselves.
The finding of an agreement is good news for our philosophical thesis (that
model-based science is “indirect” theoretical practice that should be distinguished
from more “direct” practices) and for our understanding of the historical episode.
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Yet it is only a first step: We must immediately ask whether the agreement is the
result of selection bias such that the historical episode is, in truth, a mere illustration
(as opposed to a study) of a pet philosophical thesis. Is the case hard for our thesis?
Is it paradigmatic of some aspect of science? (We would argue that the predator-prey
model is indeed a paradigmatic case of model-based science.) Do we have reasons
for believing that the thesis, although borne out by the case, might apply only lo-
cally? In general, agreement is nothing but a sign that we must now investigate the
range of applicability of our thesis (see section 5.5).
5.2 Conflict
Next, we reexamined one of Weisberg’s two examples of ADR: Charles Darwin’s
explanation of the origin and structure of coral reefs and atolls in the Pacific (Dar-
win, 1842). Weisberg understood this as a case of ADR, because “at all times, Dar-
win was talking about the actual atolls in the Pacific” (2007, p. 228). We disagreed
with this assessment. Darwin had to examine the effects of the interaction between
known processes: the subsidence of islands and the growth of corals, processes
which he investigated in some detail during his journey on the Beagle. However,
it was impossible for him to observe this interaction directly, because the process
extends over centuries. Darwin thus had to resort to a mental model of the process
and its consequences: This allowed for the indirect investigation of the genesis and
structure of coral atolls that is typical of model-based science. We thus reclassified
Darwin’s explanation as a case of modeling, extending the category to an additional,
less obvious case of non-mathematical modeling.
We must be careful about the conclusions drawn from this conflict. The first in-
stinct is to conclude that the thesis of ADR has now been rejected, as practiced in
the popular philosophical game of counterexamples. However, the appropriate thing
to do is simply to reassign Darwin to the modeling category without making judg-
ments about the existence or range of applicability of ADR, which the reevaluation
of an individual case does not permit.
5.3 Incompleteness
After determining agreements and conflicts between existing concepts and cases,
we may discover that there are some issues for which do not have any conceptual
tools at all. This sort of incompleteness may of course indicate that our existing
concepts need to be expanded or generalized by strenuous tinkering, but that strikes
us as a problematical “winner takes all” mentality. Incompleteness may just as well
indicate that a new concept needs to be developed in addition to those we already
have.
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In the example in hand, Volterra’s methodological discussion confirmed to us
the existence of an incompleteness in Weisberg’s scheme of theoretical practices.
Volterra and d’Ancona preferred to contrast model-based science with a more “di-
rect” theoretical investigation in terms not of ADR but of experimental causal infer-
ence. The authors write that for their own investigation they would have preferred
an experimental approach, which would have allowed for direct causal inferences in
the system under scrutiny. However, this was unfeasible for practical reasons having
to do with the size and time scales of ecological systems. In light of this, we added
the subcategory of causal inference as an additional theoretical practice. While the
historical case did not suggest the existence of this type of theorizing (since philoso-
phers have studied it for a long time), the sources certainly urged that causal infer-
ence as a theoretical practice is a relevant contrast to model-based science.
Instances such as this one illustrate the generative role of historical cases. By
turning to the historical sources, we were able to recognize a natural subcategory –
one of considerable philosophical interest – that needed to be added to Weisberg’s
initial range of theoretical practices.
5.4 Redundancy
The complement to incompleteness is redundancy, where we may find that we have
developed elaborate philosophical concepts that are not applicable to any part of sci-
ence. There is a philosophical prejudice in such cases for thinking that the concepts
are fine but that the search for good examples goes on. We would suspect, however,
that a failure to find good instances of a concept is an indication that the concept is
either not well developed or wholly misguided.
In the present example, the historical cases led us to suggest a redundancy. We
were convinced that Darwin’s work on coral atolls did not fit in the subcategory
of ADR, while other scholars had already argued that Mendeleev’s discovery of
the periodic table should be understood differently as well.8 We took this as an
indication that the entire subcategory of ADR may be superfluous (unless, of course,
additional instances can be presented).
5.5 Ranges of applicability
In all the steps discussed above, it is useful to keep thinking about the range of
applicability of a thesis. An agreement may indicate not that a philosophical ap-
proach is correct overall, but only that it captures a subset of cases well, while other
concepts may apply to other subsets. Similarly, a supposed counterexample may
indicate not that a thesis is false, but only that our case is outside its range of ap-
8 See Scerri (2012) for a critique of Weisberg’s interpretation of Mendeleev’s work.
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plicability. Thus, we concluded that Volterra’s work on predator-prey dynamics did
indeed fit in Weisberg’s subcategory of model-based science, while Darwin (as ex-
plained in section 5.2) had to be removed from the ADR subcategory and moved to
modeling. An examination of the Mendeleev case led us to remove that case from
the subcategory of ADR as well.9 Finally, we immediately recognized cases that fit
in the newly added subcategory of causal inference, as suggested by Volterra’s own
methodological discussions. For instance, Semmelweis’s investigation of the cause
of puerperal fever (Scholl, 2013) has long been discussed as a paradigm case of
causal inference. Finding multiple instances of a single subcategory can be taken as
an indication that a natural and effective subcategory has been found.
5.6 Summary
Just as the same historical episode can simultaneously be a hard case, a paradigm
case and an big case (depending on the philosophical concepts under study), con-
frontation will rarely involve just one of the possibilities listed above: as we investi-
gate the relationship between historical cases and philosophical theses, we will usu-
ally make several or all of the moves discussed. Some concepts will be in agreement
with the historical case, while many will be in various degrees of conflict; some of
these conflicts will be resolved by adjusting ranges of applicability, while others will
require us to consider incompleteness or redundancy. As discussed above, we see
the process of confrontation as cyclical, where a combination of the moves outlined
above will occur over multiple iterations. For the case discussed here, we summarize
the cyclical revisions in figure 2.
6 Conclusions
We have discussed a fundamental motivation for integrated history and philosophy
of science, and for case-study-based philosophy of science more generally. Philo-
sophical concepts are a useful resource for asking questions about the historical or
contemporary practice of science: They provide particularly pertinent question that
relate to science’s core epistemic project. Conversely, historical and contemporary
science provides the empirical basis for a naturalized philosophy of science, which
should be properly conceived as a theory of science in analogy to theory construc-
tion in other empirical disciplines.
Moreover, we have examined the dilemma of case studies as a methodological
challenge for integrated HPS. First, how can we minimize the danger of selection
bias in choosing our case studies? How can we choose case studies that play a pro-
9 For the time being we refrained from assigning Mendeleev to any of the other subcategories,
although Scerri (2012) suggested “classification” – which we should presumably count among
theoretical practices.
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bative instead of merely illustrative role? We have suggested that an initial remedy
is the explicit discussion of criteria for choosing a case study, and of the function
that the case study will play vis-à-vis the philosophical concepts under study. In
particular, we have outlined four main types of case studies: Hard cases, which are
chosen such that they challenge rather than illustrate the relevant philosophical con-
cepts; paradigm cases, which are taken to be typical of some aspect of science; big
cases, which concern particularly influential or otherwise important scientific find-
ings; and randomized cases, where selection bias is minimized by leaving selection
to chance.
Second, how should our conceptual engineering proceed when we are con-
fronting philosophical concepts with historical cases? We have argued that the main
mistake is to look for concepts that are too general, and to be content with their
facile confirmation or rejection. A disciplined pluralism appears to pay dividends:
We must ask about all the main categories of concepts about science (such as con-
firmation, explanation, and many more) whether they can be understood in terms
of a number of subconcepts. Much of the work will consist in naming, elaborating
and applying these subconcepts. In this procedure, individual cases do not usually
confirm or disconfirm broad categories of concepts (such as “mechanistic expla-
nation”). Instead, agreements and conflicts between concepts and cases urge us to
assess the concepts’ ranges of applicability. If our existing concepts prove inade-
quate to the understanding of historical cases, this incompleteness will challenge us
to create new concepts. In this way, historical cases are more than just a testbed for
philosophy. They also play a crucial generative role.
In 1992, David Hull asked philosophers of science for renewed ambition:
Although grand theories about the nature of science are currently out of fashion, I think
that we need to rehabilitate them. We need to construct theories about science the way
that scientists construct theories about fluids, gene flow and continental drift. (Hull, 1992,
p. 473)
We agree with Hull’s ambition and with his naturalistic approach, but his notion of
“grand theories” requires clarification. In line with the above discussion, we should
not expect to find the grand theory of science, akin to Popper deriving all aspects
of proper science from modus tollens. Rather, we should expect theories of the kind
of we find in most special sciences: a series of overlapping models (to use Giere’s
term) whose interaction and integration with each other are themselves important
questions for study. In brief, grand theories are not necessarily unified theories, and
pluralists need not fear them.
Many important issues are left unanswered by our discussion. Our types of case
studies are likely not exhaustive: We may well find a range of further types, with
distinct functions in HPS, that we have not yet considered. And similarly, much of
what we have said about the dynamics of confronting concepts and cases remains
to be made more precise and to be extended by further procedures. Moreover, there
are a number of important issues that we have only touched upon. For instance, case
studies usually leave a certain room for interpretation. Different scholars may see
different and contradictory concepts instantiated in the same episode, even when
there is no malicious intent to misrepresent. The problem is defanged somewhat by
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explicit criteria for choosing case studies, and by an awareness of the conceptual
engineering involved in confronting concepts with cases. Nevertheless, the under-
determination problem of integrated HPS and its relationship to methodology de-
serves much further discussion (see also Franklin and Collins, this volume; Kinzel,
this volume; and Räz, this volume).
To conclude, integrated history and philosophy of science promises a unique
understanding of the scientific enterprise. However, we agree with Hasok Chang,
who writes:
I believe that the neglect to clarify the nature of the history-philosophy relationship in case-
studies has contributed decisively to a widespread disillusionment with the whole HPS en-
terprise. (2011, p. 109)
We expect that a renewed methodological discussion can bring about the needed
clarification. The effort promises to pay off on both the philosophical and the histor-
ical front: we stand to gain better general theories of science and a more adequate
understanding of its history.
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